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Principal and Income Allocation of Stock 
Distributions-The Six Per Cent Rule 
A productive trust is usually dynamic in two ways: the principal 
assets appreciate in value, and their use produces income. When the 
beneficial interests in such a trust are successively divided between 
income recipients and -principal remaindermen, every payment to 
the trust must be characterized either as income or as an addition 
to principal. The most difficult categorization problems arise when 
the receipt is of corporate stock.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, the two most important methods of categorization 
were specified by the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts rules.2 The 
Pennsylvania rule allocates to income that portion of a stock divi-
dend attributable to earnings accruing to the corporation during 
the period of the trust, and to principal that portion of the dividend 
arising out of earnings accruing prior to the creation of the trust.8 
Although designed to be a rule of fairness, this rule often requires 
a detailed analysis of corporate accounting practices, and has conse-
quently proved unwieldy.4 The Massachusetts rule, on the other 
hand,_was designed for administrative convenience. For all practical 
purposes stock distributions5 under this rule are allocable entirely 
to principal.6 Although the weight of authority originally favored 
I. See generally BoGEAT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES §§ 841-59 (2d ed. 1962); 3 Scorr, TRUSTS 
§ 236 (2d ed. 1956). For some interesting statistics on the growing popularity of com• 
mon stock as a trust investment, see Barclay, Bank Trust Investments Surveyed, 103 
TRUSTS & EsTATES 682 (1964). 
2. The Kentucky rule allocated all extraordinary stock dividends to the life tenant, 
regardless of their source. Hite's Devisees v. Hite's E.x'r, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S,W. 778 (1892). 
The rule was rejected by the Kentucky court in Bowles v. Stilley's Ex'r, 267 S,W,2d 707 
(Ky. 1954), and does not appear -to be currently in effect in any jurisdiction. 
3. 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 236.3, at 1813 (2d ed. 1956). See generally Brigham, Pennsylvania 
Rules Governing the Allocation of Receipts Derived by Trustees From Shares of Stoel,, 
85 U. PA. L. REv. 358 (1937); Cohan & Dean, Legal, Tax and Accounting Aspects of 
Fiduciary Apportionment of Stock Proceeds: The Non-Statutory Pennsylvania Rules, 
106 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1957). 
4. See Matter of Payne, 7 N.Y.2d 1, 194 N.Y.S.2d 465, 163 N.E.2d 301 (1959); Cather• 
wood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961); Browning, Extraordinary Corporate Distribu• 
tions Under the New York Law of Trusts, 4 SYRACUSE L. REv. 293 (1953); Grossman, Me-
chanics of Apportionment of Receipts From Shares of Stock, 65 DICK. L. REv. 179 (1961); 
Machen, The Apportionment of Stock Distributions in Trust Accounting Practice, 20 
MD. L. REv. 89 (1960); Tenney, Stock Splits-The Trustee's Dilemma, PROCEEDINGS OF 
BANKING LAW SECiloN, N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, l (1959). 
5. For present purposes the phrase "stock distribution" refers only to a corporation's 
distribution of its own shares. The Revised Uniform Act and the New York act both 
allocate distributions of another corporation's stock to income. In addition, the phrase 
refers only to stock dividends and stock splits. Shares received in a merger or reorganiza-
tion, rights to subscribe to stock, and liquidation distributions are excluded. There is 
now basic agreement on the treatment to be given these items. See note 17 infra. 
6. See Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868). See generally BOGERT, TRUSTS &: TRUSTEES 
§ 850 (2d ed. 1962). Although extraordinary stock dividends and all stock splits are 
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the Pennsylvania approach, the Massachusetts rule has become pre-
dominant in later years. The experiences of Pennsylvania and New 
York are illustrative of the problems created by this historical evo-
lution. Pennsylvania originated its rule of apportionment in 1857.1 
The rule remained in full effect in Pennsylvania until the Uniform 
Principal and Income Act, which inc9rporated the Massachusetts 
rule, was adopted in 19458 and given retroactive effect by judicial 
decision in 1961.9 In New York, early decisions held that all stock 
dividends declared out of earnings were income, without regard to 
when the earnings were accumulated.10 The Pennsylvania rule was 
adopted in 1913,11 however, and until 1963 governed the allocation 
of stock distributions to trusts created prior to 1926. Trusts created 
subsequent to 1926 were governed by the Massachusetts rule, adopted 
by statute in that year.12 In 1963 both New York and Pennsylvania 
enacted legislation rejecting their Massachusetts rules and adopting 
versions of what has come to be called the "six per cent rule."18 New 
allocable to principal, it has never been clear how the Massachusetts rule would treat 
an ordinary stock dividend, but because of the rarity of such a device the classification 
problem is not serious. In any event, there is authority that such distributions would 
be allocated to principal. See Eastman v. State Bank, 259 Ill. App. 607 (1931); Rhode 
Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Tucker, 51 R.I. 507, 155 Atl. 661 (1931). 
7. See Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857). 
8. Laws of Pa. 1945, P.L. 416, as amended, P.L. 1283 (1947). 
9. See Catherwood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961). The constitutionality of 
giving principal and income statutes retroactive effect has been questioned. In Craw-
ford Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949), the Pennsylvania Principal and Income 
Act was denied retroactive effect. However, Catherwood overruled Crawford and two 
cases which had followed it: Warden Trust, 382 Pa. 311, 115 A.2d 159 (1955); Pew 
Trust, 362 Pa. 468, 67 A.2d 129 (1,949). New Jersey followed the Crawford decision and 
denied its Principal and Income Act retroactive effect in In re Fera, 26 N.J. 131, 139 
A.2d 23 (1958). However, all constitutional objection to specific legislative retroactivity 
in New Jersey was removed by In re Arens, 41 N.J. 364, 197 A.2d 1 (1964), and within 
the year the legislature gave the Principal and Income Act retroactive effect. N.J. REv. 
STAT. § 3A:14A-9 (Supp. 1965). Other states have had less trouble with retroactivity, 
and it now seems fair to conclude that the constitutionality of such provisions will be 
upheld. See ·Farmers Bank &: Capital Trust Co. v. Hulette, 293 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1956); 
In re Warner's Trust, 263 Minn. 449, 117 N.W.2d 224 (1962); In re Estate of Valiquette, 
122 Vt. 350, 173 A.2d 832 (1961); Will of Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W.2d 226 (1959). These 
state cases rely, in good part, upon Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924). See 
generally NEW YORK COMM'N ON EsTATES, 2D REPORT (Legis. Doc. 1963 No. 19) 196-99; 
Ives, Allocating Stock Dividends, 91 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 851 (1952). 
10. See Lowry v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 172 N.Y. 137, 64 N.E. 796 (1902); 
McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N.Y. 179, 48 N.E. 548 (1897); Riggs v. Cragg, 89 N.Y. 479 (1882). 
11. In the Matter of Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723 (1913). · 
12. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1926, ch. 843. . 
13. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 1005, § 2, as amended, ch. 336, § 2 (1965); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5(1) (1964). The Pennsylvania enactment was apparently preceded 
by judicial adoption of a similar 6% rule, although a footnote inserted at the con-
clusion of the majority opinion casts some doubt upon the prospective effect of the 
rule. Catherwood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961). However, the judicial version 
ordered a computation on the basis of total ~istributions in the current year, rather 
than upon a distribution-by-distribution basis. 
The New Jersey Legislature, following a suggestion of the state's supreme court, 
In re Arens, 41 N.J. 364, 384, 197 A.2d I, 12 (1964), adopted in 1964 a small-stock-divi-
dend allocation rule similar to those·currently in effect in New York and Pennsylvania, 
but with a 4% cutoff rather than 6%. N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A:14A-4 (Supp. 1965). 
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York's comprehensive Principal and Income Act,14 adopted two years 
later, retained the six per cent rule, but with modifications.1G Under 
the 1965 formulation, a stock distribution which does not exceed 
six per cent of the shares upon which the distribution is made is 
allocated exclusively to income. Otherwise the distribution in its 
entirety is an addition to principal. The Commissioners on Uniform 
Sta~e Laws, after considering the six per cent rule, promulgated in 
1962 a Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act16 which retains 
the previously adopted Massachusetts rule.17 
14. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw, art. 2A. See generally NEW YORK COIIIM'N ON EsTAT.ES, 3D 
REPORT (Legis. Doc. 1964 No. 19) 300; Barclay, Legislation in Aid of Administration, 
104 TRUSIS & EsTAT.ES 728 (1965). 
15. "A distribution by a corporation or association made to a trustee in the shares 
of the distributing corporation or association held in such trust, whether in the form 
of a stock split or stock dividend, at the rate of six per cent or less of the shares upon 
which the distribution is made, shall be income. Any such distribution at a greater rate 
shall be principal." N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 27•e·2. Like the New York law, the Pennsyl-
vania and New Jersey statutes allocate each stock distribution individually. That is, if a 
particular distribution, in and of itself, does not exceed the cutoff percentage it is im• 
mediately allocable to income, without regard to the existence or timing of any other 
distributions made by that corporation. There were two forerunners to this form of the 
6% rule. The third tentative draft of the Revised Uniform Act, which was ultimately 
rejected by the Commissioners, made an allocation based upon the total amount of all 
distributions received from a corporation in the corporate fiscal year; it did not deal 
with each distribution -individually. If the total amount exceeded 6% it was fully 
allocable to principal; othenvise it belonged entirely to income. The 1963 amendment 
Jo § 17(a) of the N.Y. Personal Property Law, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 1005, § 2, re• 
pealed by the 1965 Principal and Income Act, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 336, § 2, al• 
located stock distributions received in the trust year to principal to the extent they 
exceeded 6% of ·the number of shares of that stock held in the trust. 
It seems clear that the form of the rule now in effect in New York, Pennsylvania, 
and New Jersey is the best of the three approaches. In the first place, it is the most 
easily administered. Under the New York 1963 amendment an apportionment was re-
quired, in that all stock distributions received in the trust year were to be allocated 
to income to the extent of 6%, Although the third draft made a total allocation to 
one account or the other, thus eliminating any need to apportion, all distributions re-
ceived in the corporate fiscal year were to be totalled before the allocation could be 
made. This appears unsatisfactory, as it causes a delay and quite possibly superimposes 
upon ,the trust year several staggered corporate fiscal years. 
In addition to the administrative preferability of the present form of the rule, it 
does not appear that it will be arbitrary in practical effect when compared with the 
1963 amendment, which incorporated the fairness of an apportionment. Statistics in• 
dicate that the ovenvhelming percentage of small stock distributions do not exceed 6%, 
See Niles, The New 6% Stock Distribution Rule, 102 TRUSTS &: EsTAT.ES 648 (1963). As 
few dividends of 7-9% are declared, the incongruous situation where an income benefi• 
ciary receives all of a 6% and none of a 7% distribution may be considered a rarity. 
New Jersey's 4% rule may be subject to some criticism in this respect, however. 
16. "Corporate distributions of shares of the distributing corporation, including dis-
tributions in the form of a stock split or stock dividend, are principal." REVISED UNI• 
FORIII PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Ac:r: § 6(a). See generally Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 
9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. 176 (Supp. 1964). 
17. The Uniform Act and the New York Act are in basic agreement upon most of 
the problems dealt with under the "principal and income" rubric. It is important to 
consider the present discussion in light of this general agreement, because this com-
ment, centering upon one narrow, although important, aspect of the broad scheme, 
can give the impression ,that New York has completely rejected the values which can be 
~ecognized from national statutory uniformity. This is not so; there is significant diver-
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· Although the eventual disappearance of the original Pennsylvania 
rule of apportionment now seems virtually assured, the challenge 
presented to the Massachusetts view by the six per cent rule may 
prove far more formidable.18 It is anticipated, therefore, that a num-
gence between the acts only with regard to the allocation of a corporation's distribution 
of its own stock to its own shareholders. A brief, section by section, comparison of the 
acts will illustrate the general correspondence. (a) The definitional sections are virtually 
identical. Compare UPIA §§ 1, 3 with NYPIA §§ 27-b, 27-q. (b) The administrative 
duty sections are generally identical, differing only in the phrasing of the scope of 
trustee discretion. Compare UPIA § 2 with NYPIA § 27-a. (c) The sections pertaining 
to the date upon which the right to income arises are identical in substance, with 
minor differences .in wording. Compare UPIA § 4 with NYPIA § 27-c. (d) The sections 
on income earned during the administration of a decedent's estate are alike except that 
the New York act makes special provision for a situation that arose in Matter of 
Shubert, 10 N.Y.2d 461, 180 N.E.2d 410 (1962). Compare UPIA § 5 with NYPIA § 27-d. 
(e) The bond premium and discount sections are identical, except that the New York 
act employs a broader phraseology, similar to that of several other states adopting the 
Uniform Act, which enlarges the section's scope. Compare UPIA § 7 with NYPIA § 27-f. 
(f) New York omits the section on farm operations, UPIA § 8(b), but the sections on 
business operations are identical. Compare UPIA § 8(a) with NYPIA § 27-g. (g) The 
natural resource sections are identical in wording and substance. Compare UPIA § 9 
with NYPIA § 27-h. (h) The sale-of-timber sections are identical. Compare UPIA § 10 
with NYPIA § 27-i. (i) The sections on other depletable property differ; the Uniform 
Act allocates 5% to income, see UPIA § 11, whereas New York uses a prudent-man 
standard, see NYPIA § 27-j. (j) The underproductive-property sections are similar in 
basic wording but differ in ,t:lvo important respects. New York specifically excludes 
marketable securities and sets no time limitation upon the non-apportionment of land 
acquired by mortgage foreclosure. Compare UPIA § 12 with NYPIA § 27-k. (k) The 
sections on charges against income and principal differ significantly because of certain 
unique features of established New York practice, but there is no fundamental dis-
agreement. Compare UPIA § 13 with NYPIA § 27-l. (I) The important sections on 
retroactive application are identical. Compare UPIA § 14 with NYPIA § 27-m; see· 
note 9 supra. In conclusion, the New York act adopts verbatim the statement in the 
Uniform Act to the effect that its general purpose is uniformity. Compare UPIA § 15 
with NYPIA § 27-n. 
See Barclay, New York's Proposed Principal and Income Act, 102 TRusrs & EsrATES 
689 (1963); Bogert, Uniform Principal and Income Act Revised, 101 TRUSTS & EsrATES 
787 (1962); Dunham, Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 102 TRUSTS & EsrATES 
210 (1963); Note, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 473. For a discussion of the specific points of depar-
ture bet:lveen the acts, see Barclay, supra note 14. 
There are several substantively identical provisions within the corporate distribu-
tions sections of the t:IVO acts. (a) Subscription rights are principal. UPIA § 6(a); NYPIA 
§ 27-e-4. (b) Distributions stemming from the call of shares, mergers, and liquidations by 
corporate decision or court decree are principal. UPIA § 6(b); NYPIA §§ 27-e-5, 6. (c) 
The sections differentiating bet:lveen various distributions of regulated investment com-
panies are identical. Compare UPIA § 6(c) with NYPIA § 27-e-7. (d) Options to receive 
in cash or stock are income. UPIA § 6(d); NYPIA § 27-e-8. (e) Each act has a general 
provision that all other distributions are income. UPIA § 6(d); NYPIA § 27-e-10. 
In addition, the New York act covers certain items which are not mentioned in the 
Uniform Act. For instance, it is made clear that the settlor's specificaton is binding, see 
§ 27-e-l, and that the trustee shall not be liable if he retains in principal an item about 
which he is uncertain, though it turns out to be income. See § 27-e-12. 
18. Two other resolutions of the -problem of the allocation of stock distributions 
have recently been suggested. Neither is treated extensively in this comment because 
neither has attracted sufficient support ,to be considered a viable alternative to the 6% 
and Massachusetts rules. · 
(1) The "prudent man" rule. This approach has been adopted by statute in.Del-
aware. Under •the Delaware _formulation, '.1 trustee sh~ trC!lt all propel'ty received as 
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her of states will reevaluate their rules regulating the allocation of 
stock distributions between principal and income. It is hoped that 
the following discussion of the Massachusetts and six per cent rules 
and their ramifications will provide the necessary guidelines for 
legislators who must permanently resolve this issue in order to avoid 
a duplication of those problems with which trustees and draftsmen 
in Pennsylvania and New York have been forced to contend as a 
result of vacillating statutory framework. 
II. EFFECTUATING SETTLoR's PROBABLE INTENT THROUGH 
STATUTORY ENACTMENT 
Rarely, if ever, does a settlor define "income" when he provides 
that "income" or "net income" be paid to one person, while ''princi-
pal" or "corpus" be held for another.19 Thus, the initial inquiry in 
a corporate distribution as income to the extent that, in the judgment of the trustee, it 
would be regarded by men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence in the management 
of their own affairs as income from the investment. DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 12, § 3526 
(Supp. 1964). For criticisms of this rule, see NEW YORK CoMM'N ON EsrATES, 2D REPORT 
(Legis. Doc. 1963 No. 19) 177; Dunham, Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act, 
101 TRUSIS & EsTATES 894, 896 (1962). 
(2) "Anticipatory apportionment." This plan provides for the periodic invasion of 
corpus to maintain the income beneficiary's rate of return. The trustee would multiply 
the market value of the stock at the beginning of the year by the bond yield, and then, 
at the end of the year, distribute sufficient corpus to make up the amount by which this 
figure exceeded the dividends received. See text accompanying notes 24-26 infra; Aron-
stein, Common Stocks in Trust, 113 U, PA. L. REv. 228, 253 (1964); Aronstein, Toward 
Growth With Fair Return, 104 TRUSTS &: EsrATES 788 (1965). For a critical view of this 
suggestion, see Barclay, The Lot of the Income Beneficiary (pts. 1 &: 2), 104 TRUSTS &: 
EsTATES 144, 277 (1965). 
For an approach which seems to represent a combination of the "prudent man" and 
"anticipatory apportionment" proposals, see Wells, Pity the Poor Income Beneficiary, 
103 TRusrs & EsrATES 119 (1964), suggesting anticipatory apportionment on a prudent 
man basis, rather than through the application of a specific formula. 
19. The meaning of "income" differs according to its context. To the corporation, 
the excess of revenues over expenses may be considered income. However, for tax pur-
poses that excess is not income to the individual shareholder because he must part with 
some of his proportionate interest in the corporation in order to realize any tangible 
benefit. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); note 47 infra and accompanying 
text. Yet, if this same shareholder is the income beneficiary of a trust, it may be argued 
that for allocation purposes corporate earnings should be considered income, 
Both the Uniform Act and the New York act begin with the same definition: "In-
come is the return in money or property derived from the use of principal ••• ," RE· 
VISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Ac::r § 3(a); N.Y. PERS. PROP. I.Aw § 27-b-1. How-
ever, the acts proceed ,to modify this definition, in opposite ways, in their sections 
concerning corporate distributions. 
The question of what significance the usual settlor ascribes to the source of the dis-
tributed property is of course essential to any discussion of allocation rules in general. 
For example, should cash or stock dividends from paid-in surplus be considered income? 
Sh!)uld cash or stock dividends from earned surplus acquired prior to the trust's pur-
chase of the shares be income? However, for the purposes of the present discussion this 
problem is not really relevant, as neither the 6% rule nor the Massachusetts rule dis• 
tinguishes between stock splits and stock dividends, and neither can be preferred on 
the ground that it does or does not give weight to the source of the distribution. It will 
therefore be assmp.ed that all increased bopk value and all capitalized distributionii 
derive from operational earnings. There is an obvious caveat here, however. Inherent 
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'interpreting the trust instrument is necessarily directed to determin-
ing the se_ttlor's intent.20 Likewise, it would seem that legislators, 
when analyzing the merits of the Massachusetts and six per cent 
rules, should be initially concerned with adopting a statute most 
closely incorporating the settlor's probable intent. It becomes im-
mediately apparent in the context of the allocation of stock distri-
butions, however, that a settlor could, if he considered the problem, 
adopt any one of several constructions for "income." 
If it is the conclusion of the legislature that the settlor would 
generally construe "income" in light of the nature of corporate 
ownership, the Massachusetts rule should be adopted. Common stock 
is not evidence of a debt, but rather of participation in the success 
or failure of a business enterprise. Given the discretion of the board 
of directors in distributing or retaining earnings,21 the settlor would, 
upon considering the question in this light, probably intend his term 
"income" to encompass only actual distributions of corporate assets.22 
Under such a construction of the settlor's intent, all stock dividends 
would be allocated to principal, for the distribution of a stock divi-
dend does not alter corporate net worth. Previously withheld earn-
ings remain in the hands of the corporation. Before a trustee can be 
said to have realized tangible value, he must sell the stock received 
as a dividend, thus surrendering a portion of the trust's participation 
in future earnings and diluting whatever control may have been 
possessed. Since the same amount of money could have been received 
through a·sale of the same proportionate share of the trust's holdings 
before the dividend, the distribution of the dividend does not in any 
way facilitate the trustee's realization of tangible assets, and thus 
cannot be considered income. : 
in the reasoning supporting the 6% rule is an assumption, with some empirical basis, 
that small stock distributions generally have their source in the capitalization of 
earned surplus, and that the rule is not therefore subject to the criticism that it al-
locates to income that which the settlor would never consider to be income: unearned 
surplus. See Shapleigh, How Fair Is the Six Percent Rule on Stock Distributions?, 104 
TRUSTS &: EsTATES 908 (1965). 
20, Although it is clear that the settlor's intention is the ultimate allocation deter-
minant, there has been some question whether a direction in a will to allocate stock 
distributions to .principal would constitute an invalid accumulation of income in those 
states where ,the law would otherwise assign part of the distribution to the income 
account. It was so held in Maris's Estate, 301 Pa. 20, 151 Atl. 577 (1930). However, New 
York is to the contrary, Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 250 N.Y. 1, 164 N.E. 723 (1928); 
and the Pennsylvania holding has subsequently been changed by statute, PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 20, § 301.6 (Supp. 1965). 
21. See Moskowitz v. Bantrell, 190 A.2d 749 (Del. 1963); 11 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoR- . 
PORATIONS § 5325 n.72 (perm. ed. rev. rep!. 1958). Two cases in New York suggest an 
exception for,corporations controlled by trustees. In the Matter of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 
299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937); In the Matter of McLaughlin, 164 Misc. 539, 299 
N.Y. Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. 1937). 
22. Any possible distinctions that might be developed between the treatment of pre-
ferred and common stocl<, or between varying classes of common, are not considered 
in the present discussion, since little or no sentiment for the making of such distinc-
tions exists. Simplicity is the admitted goal of both rules. 
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If, however, the legislature concludes that the settlor would 
generally construe "income" in light of the practical consequences 
to the income beneficiary, then it might find merit in the six per cent 
rule. Certainly a settlor might reason that although a share of stock 
does not entitle the holder to any more than a proportionate partici-
pation in actual distributions, the holder may realize the value of the 
retained earnings, or some part thereof, through increased market 
value of the stock. Theoretically, the increased book value which 
derives from the retention of earnings will be reflected by the price 
of the stock, and the price may even increase to a disproportionate 
extent in response to the anticipation of the future growth suggested 
by such retention. Thus, the settlor might equate the term "income" 
with the full amount of corporate earnings, or some fixed portion 
thereof, expecting that the earnings will be tangibly realized by the 
income beneficiaries through periodic sales of shares held by the 
trustee in the principal account. The timing of the sales and the 
computation of the number of shares to be sold present problems23 
probably best solved by a device called "anticipatory apportion-
ment."24 This means of apportionment calls for distribution to in-
come beneficiaries from the trust corpus whenever the pure income 
yield on the corpus falls below the current bond yield, as determined 
by an acceptable national index. However, a definition which equates 
income with some fixed portion of corporate earnings, whether or 
not actually distributed, and which quite logically compels some type 
of periodic apportionment is an extreme definition which supporters 
of the six per cent rule are not forced to accept. Rather, they may 
more moderately conclude that the typical settlor uses the term "in-
come" to mean simply a return to tl;le income beneficiaries larger 
than that provided by cash dividends, at least in those cases where, 
. because of the retention of earnings, the yield from cash dividends 
is significantly low'er than the bond yield.25 Periodic apportionment 
would accomplish a full-scale effectuation of such an intention. How-
ever, it presents some danger of stunting the growth of the corpus, 
and thus in the long run might adversely affect both income benefi-
ciaries and remaindermen.26 This danger, coupled with the revo-
23. Such problems include the quest/-ons of when there has been a sufficient increase 
in book value and market price to warrant a sale, whether a rise in market price has 
been caused by the retention of earnings or by some combination of speculation and 
inflation, and what treatment should be accorded decreases in market value. 
24. See note 18 supra. ' 
25. This conclusion is supported by the fact that most of the anti-inflationary benefit 
from holding common stock accrues to the remainderman. While the market price of 
the stock will tend to rise with the cost of living, accompanying increases in an initially 
deflated cash dividend will provide little protection for the income beneficiary. 
26. Without attempting a comprehensive criticism, it might be suggested that irt 
developing his theory of anticipatory apportionment Aronstein, Common Stoclcs in 
Trust, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 228 (1964), overemphasizes the income beneficiary's predica-
ment, and is consequently driven to .this rather drastic solution. He assumes that the 
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lutionary nature of periodic apportionment, indicates that it is not 
a viable alternative solution. Nevertheless, it is clear that the six per 
cent rule is a closer approximation than the Massachusetts rule to 
the intent of a settlor wishing to provide the income beneficiaries 
with an amount greater than that of the cash dividends alone. 
The differences in yield between stock and debt securities are 
significant. Since 1962 the average yield on long-term taxable Trea-
sury bonds has fluctuated between 3.8% and 4.25%, and the average 
yield on Aaa and Aa corporate bonds has varied between 4.25 % and 
4.6%. In the same time period, the average yield upon industrial 
common stocks has never exceeded 3.8% and has gone as low as 
2,8%.27 Thus, trust assets in the form of common stock produce 
about one per cent less current income than do debt securities.28 The 
allocation of small stock dividends to income cannot completely cor-
rect this situation. Not every corporation whose stock yields less than 
four per cent makes recurring stock distributions in an amount suf-
ficient to compensate for the depressed cash yield. In addition, stock 
distributions which are made may exceed six per cent and thus be of 
no benefit to the income beneficiary.29 On the other hand, the distrib-
uting corporation may be one which already returns a sufficient 
common stock corpus will yield only 3½% in cash dividends and that the value of the 
corpus will appreciate only about 5% per year, while the bond yield is assumed to be 
a constant 4½%· As a result, he concludes that the common stock yield does not ;each 
the level of the bond yield until the tenth year. However, the following figures indicate 
that this may be somewhat pessimistic, and that the yields may become comparable 
within four or five years. The income and growth stocks listed here were among the 
most popular with trustees in 1964 and 1965. See A Good Investment Year, 104 TRUSTS 
&: EsTATES 29 (1965); The figures are derived from 1965 volumes of STANDARD &: Pooa's, 
STANDARD CORPORATION DESCRIPTIONS. 
Income Stocks Growth Stocks 
1954 1964 1954 1964 
yield yield• yield yield• 
GM 4.5 17.0 GE 3.6 5.2 
AT&: T 5.4 7.0 Texaco 5.2 10.3 
Stand. N.J. 5.0 9.9 DuPont 4.0 5.3 
Socony 5.1 8.0 Union Carb. 3.2 4.6 
Phillips 4.1 6.3 Sears-Roeb. 4.5 8.4 
Amer. Cyan. 4.1 8.2 Gen. Foods 4.0 11,8 
Int. Paper 4.2 4.9 East. Kodak 3.4 8.8 
Amer. Can 3.7 4.8 Gulf Oil 3.6 9.1 
CIT Fin. 5.9 8.4 Dow Chem. 2.5 4.4 
Cont. Ins. 3.4 5.3 Caterpillar 3.1 14.1 
United Gas 4.2 5.5 Merck 4.0 14.0 
Average 4.5 7.8 Average 3.7 s!i 
Combined 
Average 4.1 8.2 
• Based on 1954 price. 
27. See Moody's Investors Yield Table, 104 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 796 (1965). 
28. See authorities cited note 18 supra; Niles, The New 6% Stock Distribution Rule, 
102 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 648 (1963); Shapleigh, supra note 19. 
29. But see note 15 supra. 
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cash yield, so that the stock distribution will result in an excessive 
allocation to the income beneficiary. However, in contradistinction 
to the Massachusetts rule, which necessarily aggravates any unfairness 
to the income beneficiary, the six per cent rule does provide some 
measure of alleviation, and there is empirical evidence which indi-
cates that the impact may be significant.30 Recent trends also suggest 
that the number of small stock dividends declared will rise in years 
to come, increasing the impact of the method of allocation employed. 
Although in the period from 1949 to 1954 there were only 686 stock 
dividends and splits declared by corporations listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange,31 there were 1549 declared between 1959 and 1964.82 
Thus, the essence of the argument for the six per cent rule, which 
allocates small stock distributions to income, is not that such distri-
butions are in fact the equivalent of ordinary cash dividends, but 
rather that the term "income" encompasses more than cash distri-
butions, because retained earnings may be realized upon through the 
increased market value of the stock. It is not argued by proponents 
of the six per cent rule that the shares received as the result of a 
stock dividend represent a valuable distribution of corporate prop-
erty. Such a dividend is simply viewed as a convenient mechanism 
for the partial alleviation of what is felt to be an imbalance between 
the trust's principal and income accounts-a workable means of re-
allocating part of what may rightfully belong to income, given the 
difference in yield between equity and debt securities. 
Yet the Uniform Act rejects the six per cent rule.38 Several 
reasons have been put forth to explain the rejection. The first is an 
extension of the definitional argument discussed previously.84 It was 
suggested that the settlor might equate "income" from common stock 
with- total corporate earnings because the stockholder is an owner 
of the enterprise and, although he cannot force a distribution of the 
30. See generally Shapleigh, supra note 19. 
31. See 1965 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FAcr BooK 38. 
32. Ibid. Three factors account for the present popularity of stock dividends. 
Retained earnings are an inexpensive source of new capital, avoiding the selling costs 
of a public offering. There can be benefit to the shareholder, as the declaration of 
an extra stock dividend may precipitate a somewhat illogical rise in market price, 
which can be converted into cash at capital gains rates. In addition, it is often said 
that a stock dividend conserves cash for the corporation. Sec Corey, Cash Plus Stoch 
Dividends, 98 TRusrs &: EsTATES 339 (1959). For a critical view of this assertion, sec 
Barclay, Stock Dividends Belong to Pri1fcipal, 103 TRUsrs &: EsTATES 482 (1964). 
33. The third tentative draft of the Uniform Act revision adopted a form of the 
6% rule, in preference to the Massachusetts rule, but the 6% rule was rejected in the 
final draft. See note 15 supra; Dunham, supra note 18. It is interesting to trace a change 
of .position by George C. Barclay. Compare articles favoring the 6% rule, written as 
late as March 1964, Third Draft of Revised Principal and Income Act, 101 TRUSTS &: 
EsTATES 505 (1962), The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 101 id. 833 (1962), 
Supervision of Trust Powers to Comptroller?, 101 id. 833 (1962), and Dividend Allocation 
Powers, 103 id. 272 (1964), with. Barclay, Stock Dividends Belong to Principal, 103 id. 
482 (1964). 
34. See Barclay, supra note 32. 
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earnings,85 he can re11lize upon these earnings by selling part of his 
ownership interest, which the .retention has caused to appreciate in 
value. However, this reasoning can be carried a step further. Com-
mon stock is an interest in a business enterprise, the management 
of which is entrusted to a board of directors. Cash dividends are the 
only return from this interest. A stock dividend or split, which is not 
a distribution of earnings and does not alter the proportionate in-
terest of the shareholder, cannot be considered income in and of 
itself. Furthermore, there is no persuasive reason why the income 
beneficiary should have any claim to retained earnings. The board 
of directors decides upon this immediate reinvestment with the ex-
pectation that it will result in increased future earnings, which will 
permit increased cash dividends. 36 These will of course accrue to the 
income beneficiary. Thus, it might be concluded that the typical 
settlor contemplating trust ownership of stock would rely upon the 
judgment of the. board of directors regarding the long-run advis-
ability of distributing or retaining earnings, and would expect his 
income beneficiary to receive only those earnings distributed as cash 
dividends, rather than the greater amount with which proponents of 
the six per cent rule seek to effectuate what they view as the intent 
of the settlor.37 In addition, it must be remembered that if a reten-
tion of earnings is successful it may well cause the cash yield to sur-
pass comparable bond yield in a very few years.88 
Ill. EFFECTUATING SETTLOR'S INTENT THROUGH TRUSTEE'S 
DISCRETION 
In light of the variety of views a settlor could reasonably take 
with respect to the meaning of the ambiguous term "income," it is 
apparent that any attempt to develop a generalized conception of 
the typical settlor's intention through manipulation of the legal 
attributes of stock and stock dividends is fruitless. Since the actual 
intention of the settlor is as varied as the family situation, it would 
seem that, rather than attempting to anticipate intention by statute, 
the construction and effectuation of the settlor's purpose is best rele-
gated to the discretion of the trustee, with the usual judicial super-
vision and remedial sanctions. There are several channels through 
which this discretion may operate. First, the trustee may fashion the 
trust portfolio to accomplish the purposes which he feels the settlor 
intended. If the primary concern is for the remaindermen, as, for 
example, when the income beneficiary is otherwise well provided 
for, the bulk of the corpus may be invested in growth stocks show-
35. See note 21 supra. 
36. See note 26 supra. 
37. See text accompanying note 25 supra. 
38. See note 26 supra. 
866 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:856 
ing low cash yields. On the other hand, if the income beneficiary 
has pressing needs and the remaindermen are remote or unascer-
tained secondary recipients, a more substantial return may be 
achieved by purchasing debt securities and income-oriented stocks 
showing significant cash yields. Such portfolio manipulation can 
reduce potential unfairness under the Massachusetts rule. However, 
it is asserted by proponents of the six per cent rule that the six 
per cent rule allows the trustee to hold reliable low-yield growth 
stocks even when the primary trust purpose is the production of 
income. This argument assumes, however, that the corporations 
whose shares are considered a desirable growth stock regularly dis-
tribute small stock dividends, which does not at present appear to be 
the case,39 and that good income stocks do not appreciate in value, 
which also appears not to be the case.4° Furthermore, even under the 
six per cent rule the trustee must rely heavily upon high-yield securi-
ties when income is the primary goal. 
The second, and probably more desirable, mechanism for effect-
ing the settlor's intention is the power of invasion. The trustee is not 
required to make any income distributions, but is authorized, in his 
discretion, to distribute as much from both principal and income 
as he feels to be appropriate.41 Such an authorization liberates the 
trustee's investment policy. Rather than structure the portfolio for 
the immediate production of income, he may choose those securities 
which promise the best return in terms of a combination of cash yield 
and market appreciation. Ultimately this is the most favorable course 
for the income beneficiaries as well as for the remaindermen, because 
the absolute cash income, even without exercise of the power to in-
vade, will tend to increase as the securities grow in market value. But 
the most important aspect of a power to invade is .that it provides a 
complete remedy for any undervaluation of the income beneficiary's 
share. Unlike the six per cent rule, the remedy is not dependent for 
its effectiveness upon the vagaries of corporate financial decisions. 
The power to invade eliminates the danger that, in any given trust 
year, there may be too few or too many small stock distributions to 
provide a fair return for the income beneficiary. However, the six 
per cent rule may create some pitfalls for the draftsman who seeks to 
use the power to invade to accomplish this more complete solution. 
That is, not only is the six per cent rule a less effective remedy, but 
it may also make employment of the better solution hazardous. The 
statutory characterization of small stock distributions as income, 
coupled with powers to accumulate income or to allocate stock 
dividends, or coupled with a direction that stock dividends be al-
39. See Aronstein, Common Stocks in Trust, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 228, 244 (1964); 
A Good Investment Year, 104 TRUSTS & EsTATES 29 (1965). 
40. See note 26 supra; Barclay, supra note 32, at 484. 
41. See generally 2 Scorr, TRUSTS §§ 187.2, .3 (2d ed. 1956). 
March 1966] Stor;k Distributions 867 
located to principal,42 can create interpretative problems where legal 
consequences depend upon whether the settlor has allocated "all of 
the income" to the income beneficiary. For example, valid use of the 
federal estate tax marital deduction may require that the surviving 
spouse be entitled, for life, to "all the income" from certain of the 
decedent's property.43 Of greater interest in New York is the possi-
bility that the surviving spouse's limited right of election will not be 
effectively foreclosed by a trust which allows the reallocation of small 
stock distributions. It has been held that the full income of the trust 
must, on the face of the will, be given to the surviving spouse in 
order to pre-empt an election.44 Certainly these hurdles are not insur-
mountable, but ·they do suggest that the six per cent rule can have 
unexpected side effects which are most troublesome for the more 
careful draftsmen. 
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the six per cent rule is not 
without practical merit. If ·the settlor has not given the trustee ade-
quate powers for the diversification of investment and the discre- , 
tionary distribution of corpus, the six per cent rule may well provide 
an important measure of relief for the income beneficiary. It is, of 
course, in these cases, where careful planning is absent, that the statu-
tory rules of allocation are most important. Of course, if the legisla-
ture concludes that trust law should facilitate the legitimate and care-
ful planning of experienced draftsmen rather than catering to and 
relieving the inadvertent and inexpert, the primary emphasis of the 
six per cent rule, directed as it is at alleviating the consequences of 
inadequate planning, is fundamentally suspect. 
IV. NoNSUBJEGrIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
A number of other grounds for rejection of the six per cent rule 
have been suggested. First, through the receipt of stock dividends the 
income beneficiary is able to acquire part of the basis of the trust as-
sets and thus, upon sale, to reduce his tax burden at the expense of the 
42. It might be suggested that a power of invasion can be effective without these 
concomitant powers of accumulation, and ,thus without contravening .the 6% rule. 
However, it is often thought desirable that the trustee be able to redirect stock divi-
dends to facilitate administration. Certainly, the textual discussion is less appropriate 
when administrative facility is not felt to necessitate such powers. 
It might also be suggested that the trustee be given the power to allocate, in the 
first instance, between principal and income. In such cases, when receipts are classified 
as principal from the outset rather than being income originally and then redirected 
through the trustee's administrative power of appointment, it is less likely that prob-
lems concerning the marital deduction and the New York right of election stemming 
from the phrase "all the income" will be encountered. But see Blish, Discretionary 
Allocation Provisions, 45 TRUST BuLL. 35 (1965). 
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5). But see Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5{f)(3), (4) 
Q%~ . 
44. See In the Matter of Kunc, 43 Misc. 2d 387, 251 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Surr. Ct. 1964). 
But see In the Matter of Baileson, 16 N.Y.2d 757, 262 N.Y.S.2d 487, 209 N.E.2d 810 
(1965); In the Matter of Edwards, 2 Misc. 2d 564, 152 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Surr. Ct. 1956). 
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remaindermen.45 Although it is arguable that such a windfall to the 
income beneficiary is consonant with the purposes of the six per cent 
rule, since that rule augments the depressed return which the income 
beneficiary may be receiving, it is more in keeping with the presumed 
intention of the settlor and the assumptions inherent in the Internal 
Revenue Code's conduit theory of taxation of trust income40 to 
expect that the remainderman will have the full benefit of the basis. 
If small stock distributions are to be treated as income for trust pur-
poses because it is assumed that the settlor would desire some supple-
ment to income when stock is held, they should also be treated as 
income for tax purposes. It may be suggested, in response, that this 
is a flaw in the tax law, rather than in the six per cent rule, and that 
the criticism is therefore misdirected. This argument, however, raises 
a second problem. It is conceivable that remedial activity in the tax 
laws could extend beyond a mere provision preserving basis for the 
principal account and precipitate a reevaluation of Eisner v. Macom-
ber, 41 the foundation of the present nontaxable status of stock 
dividends.48 The reasoning of Macomber is sound when applied to 
• the individual shareholder-tax.payer, since the nature and extent of 
his interest in the corporation are not changed by the dividend, but 
are simply represented by a greater number of shares. Accumulated 
earnings are not paid out and thus are not realized. However, when 
the shareholder is a trust, and local law commands that six per cent 
stock dividends be distributed as income, there is clearly a realization 
from the income beneficiary's standpoint. Such a stock dividend may 
possess sufficient independent significance to be considered an appro-
priate taxable event. Indeed, Mr. Justice Brandeis, who, along with 
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissented in Macomber, made specific reference 
to the Pennsylvania rule of apportionment to support his contention 
that stock dividends may be considered income.49 However, a re-
examination of Macomber is certainly unlikely at this late date. Al-
though apparently near rejection following Helvering v. Griffiths,50 
the Macomber doctrine was reaffirmed and given specific legislative 
approval with the enactment of section 305(a) of the 1954 Internal 
Revenue Code, and could probably weather any storm created by 
investigation into the present provisions concerning allocation of 
basis. 
Difficulty in administration has been suggested, apparently by 
analogy to the discredited Pennsylvania rule of apportion~ent, as a 
45. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 307(a). 
46. See Subchapter J. 
47. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). See Dunham, supra note 18, at 895. 
48. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 305. 
49. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 233·37 (1920). See Lowndes, The Taxation of 
Stock Dividends and Stock Rights, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 147 (1947). 
50. 318 U.S. 371 (1943). 
<> 
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third collateral criticism of the six per cent rule.51 An immediate real-
location of basis will be required following all distributions of six 
per cent or less. In addition, the volume of small distributions which 
will have to be processed may increase as corporations returning low 
yields seek to make their stock more at~ractive for trust investment. 
On the other hand, under the six per cent rule as it is now worded, 
a trustee need only determine the distribution ratio to know whether 
to allocate entirely to income or entirely to principal. The former 
problems of differentiating stock splits and stock dividends, of dis-
tinguishing ordinary and extraordinary distributions, of computing 
"intact value," and of determining the source of the assets capitalized 
are all eliminated. Therefore, although experience with the six per 
cent rule may ultimately dictate a different conclusion, it would 
appear that the administrative problems are not burdensome. 
Finally, it has been suggested that in the interests of uniformity 
the Massachusetts rule embodied in the Uniform Act is preferable to 
the six per cent rule. 52 Although there is some merit in this sugges-
tion, uniformity is not as pressing here as in other areas of the law, 
and a possibly inferior provision should clearly not be accepted sim-
ply to promote uniformity. 
These collateral criticisms of the six per cent rule thus appear to 
be little more than makeweights. None is of sufficient substance by 
itself to support acceptance or rejection of either the six per cent rule 
or the Massachusetts rule. However, since legislative opinion on this 
matter must rest upon a balance of individually insignificant factors, 
the criticisms are worth considering. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Pennsylvania rule of apportionment can be considered a rule 
of fairness only upon the assumption that the term "income," as used 
in the trust instrument, is to be fully equated with current corporate 
earnings. Such an equation is at best tenuous; "income" expresses the 
settlor's intention, which in all likelihood embodies an expectation 
that some earnings will be retained. Even if "income" is construed 
to be a term of art, any definition formulated with a clear under-
standing of the nature of corporate ownership would allocate stock 
dividends to principal. Thus the six per cent rule must rely upon 
the undervaluation of the income beneficiary's share caused by the 
. growing trust investment in low-yield stock to maintain its case of un-
fairness against the Massachusetts rule. Yet there is a more satisfac-
51. See Dunham, supra note 18, at 895. 
52. See Niles, supra note 28. The author also suggests that, because of precedent and 
reliance by draftsmen, the Massachusetts rule should be retained in New York. It does 
not seem likely, however, that a settlor wishing to have the Massachusetts rule applied 
would do so by silent reliance, rather than simply directing that all stock distributions 
be allocated to principal. 
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tory method of dealing with this undervaluation. Responsible draft-
ing and careful investment can provide adequately for the income 
beneficiary. Power in the trustee to accumulate and invade can pro-
vide a flexible means-a means far more complete and workable than 
the six per cent rule-of balancing the successive interests in a trust. 
Although the six per cent rule may alleviate harshness in restrictively 
dra,m trusts, the possible pitfalls which it poses for careful drafts-
men, under federal income and estate tax law as well as local dece-
dent estate law, coupled with the danger of its causing increased 
administrative burdens for the trustee, would appear to outweigh its 
beneficial effects. 
Michael G. Devine 
